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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
~'l'"\TEMI~i\'T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding under the Industrial Act for 
rr·c·o\ery of workmen's compensation henefits claimed 
!l\ plaintiff for physical disahility arising out of his 
1·11111ioyrnP11t with tlw defendant, the State Board of 
H"alth. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
TNDFSTRIAL COMMISSION 
'!'he I ndnstrial Commission heard evidence on the 
plaintiff's claim and concluded that there was no evi-
d1·11e1· tli(· :s<'izurp activity experienced by plaintiff was 
di1wtly l'l'latPd to plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff mov-
:od to revi('w tht< order of the Commission, contending, 
iirtr·r alia, that tlw Commission's findings were contrary 
2 
to the evidence presented at the hearings, that tht· .·. 
1.tiJ1 
clusions of the Medical Panel wt>re in error in vit~W of tli, 
fads and circumstances present at the time the work 110 , 
in progress and the failure of the panel to take i11 t0 d\'-
count certain significant factors (R 211, 212). 'Ph" Mo-
tion for Review was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The case is before this court on writ of certiorari 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the Industrial 
Commission and an order directing judgment in favor 
of plaintiff, or that failing, a new hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Sunday, July 19, 1964, around 11 :00 o 'cloek in 
the evening, plaintiff experienced painful musenlar 
cramps and spasms involving his left side. On his way \11 
the hospital he began having severe generalized seizllll' 
activity which continued for approximately a 24:-hom 
period, resulting in plaintiff's total and permanent di~­
ability. The Utah Department of Health's Compensation 
insurer, State Insurance Fund, denied liability for ,1·ork-
men's compensation benefits and plaintiff filed his ap-
plication for compensation with the Industrial Co1111ni~­
sion. Hearing was set for February 8, 1965, at \rhid1 
time the testimony of plaintiff and others was taken. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the referee referred thP 
medical issues to a panel of doctors. The panel filed it~ 
report and objections to the report were heard by thP 
Commission. A second report was issued which "·a~ 
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:idoptPd hy the Commission. This report found that there 
i.il'' no t~vidPnce that tlw seizure activity was directly 
n·latrd to tlw circumstances surrounding plaintiff's em-
iJ]ovmPnt prior to tlw onset of his convulsive activity. 
Plaintiff went to work for the Utah Department of 
lkalth afi a janitor in January of 1960. His work up until 
.lnh of l 9G-I- eom;isted of janitorial and general mainten-
.irH··i· clutiPs, including carpenter work, painting, plumb-
in"., \1ashing windows, etc. (R. 34). During the week 
i·olJIHlPn<'ing .July 13, 1964, plaintiff was required to per-
ionn an entirt'ly different type of work. A hot water pipe 
in tlw ]Jmwment of the building was broken and it became 
np1·Pssary to make an opening in an 8-inch cement wall 
[11 g-ain aceess to the pipe. The portion of the wall which 
!tail to lw drilled was located about 35 feet back in a 
.'u1nll tunnel, about 4 feet wide and 4-Yz to 5 feet high, 
11h1eh connected to the furnace room. The tunnel was 
filled with various types of pipes servicing the building, 
:--111·h a:o; stPam, hot water, sewage, etc. To get into the 
tnm1el, plaintiff would have to either stoop over or sit 
r11nrn on a four wheeled cart and push himself back. 
'J 1hP tenqwratnre in the tunnel was a "lot warmer" than 
i11 thP ontside rooms and halls. Once in the tunnel, plain-
tiff \\·onld use a rotary f'lectric drill which the workmen 
n•frrred to as a "jackhammer" (Exhibit A) weighing 
lwhrt>t•n 30 and 40 pounds, to drill through the concrete. 
H:cau~1· of the confined area in the tunnel it was not 
J! 11 ~~ihh· to stand erect while working. Since the drill was 
:--n lwav.1·, it had to be suspended from the pipes with 
1l'ir1• arnl swung back and forth (R. 35-41). 
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Plaintiff testified that lH· workl•d in tlH' turn1(•l ui,,.-
of the week with the exct>ption of one day Sllt>nt 1110 y111 ,, 
furniture. He specifically recalled working on Frida: 
July 17, and recalled a conversation about a llP\\' (lril; 
that was purchased on that Friday ( R 47). During vart 
of the time spent in the tunnel plaintiff '.Vorke<l with .\Ii 
Prunkard, who would hold the barrel of the drill and 
guide it, while plaintiff would reach over the pipes tu t:iJ\,. 
hold of the handle and apply pressure to the drill 1 B 
-10-41). Since Mr. Prunkard also handk•d tlw 1uai I foi 
the building he only worked with plainiff for ahout tJ 11w 
hours each day ( R. -1-1). rrhe rest of the time s l)('nt in th1 
tunnel plaintiff worked alone, lifting and 01wrating th:· 
drill by himself ( R. 62). 
The rental agreement for the dectric drill u~Pd in 
the tunnel was signed by Mr. Prunkard and inclieak, 
that the drill was leased out at 9 :14 a.m., on July J::l, l~lili 
(Exhibit 2). There was some trouble with thP drill \Ji,. 
first day and the agreement indicates a "new time starlt1l 
7 /15/64." rrhe invoice shows a charge for 2-% days ti1111'. 
Due to the strenuous nature of the drilling work 
plaintiff received blisters on his fingers and hand frn1t1 1 
working the drill ( R. 44, 75). ·when he went home after 
working in the tunnel, he was totally exhausted and hi' 
clothes would be wringing wet from heavy perspiration 
(R. 50, 76). Contrary to his usual practice, his wifr <lrn1,1• 
the car home during the time he was working in th1 
tunnel. 
On Saturday, July 18, plaintiff was so exhau~t~d 
from the wPek's work, he rested most of the dfl ,\- ( R. ;'i(JJ ' 
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llri Snnda.v, .July 19, he went to a family reumon m 
Manti, Ptah, and returned around 8 :30 o'clock in the 
i·venrng. Around 11 :00 o'clock that evening, he felt a 
"i·ltarlt>Y horse" sensation in his left hand and arm which 
~l'r":ul to tlw whole of his left side accompanied by 
,, \'('rt' pain. Ht:· was shortly thereafter rushed to the 
linspital where he was diagnosed as having a series of 
"l'Jlf'ralii<'<l seizures, grand mal in nature, which con-
~iinw<l for about a 24-hour period (R. 19-23). 
Approximately 25 years prior to this incident, plain-
tiff \\·as thrown from a horse striking the right side of 
hi~ !wad. Subsequent study revealed a subdural hemo-
toJ11a and he was operated on by Dr. Reed Harrow in 
Salt Lah City, which resulted in limited impairment to 
]1is Ht hand. Plaintiff fully recovered from the opera-
ti011, and suffered no ill effects from the injury since 
rhat i i11w, exce1Jt the impaired left hand (R. 30, 34). 
Plaintiff's doctor, Kenneth J. Nielson, treated him 
during the time the seizures were occurring. In a letter 
to the Industrial Commission, dated September 26, 1964, 
Dr. l\ielson stated that in his opinion the seizure was a 
result of the prior brain damage, precipitated by stren-
11011s acticity (R. 1 ). Dr. Nielson testified that the seiz-
ur1•s PXJJPrienced by plaintiff began as Jacksonian and 
he1·a111P g-rand mal. The seizures continued for approx-
i111at('l.Y a 24-hour period ( R. 17 4). As a result of the 
,;1·iz;m<• adivity, Dr. Nielson testified that plaintiff was 
]li'n11anmtl,\· and totally disabled (R. 176). 
Dr. E. Daniel Nusbaum, a neurologist, also ex-
11111i11Pd ]>laintiff. Dr. Nnsbanm had considerable ex-
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perience as a :\a val Doctor dealing with indivi(lllaJ, 
exercising in high thermal environment, some of whoni 
died in a status epilepticus and others of various form~: 
of physical failure and collapse, all associated with heavy 
sweating ( R. 18-1). · 
Dr. Nusbaum also rendt>red his opinion of plaintin·~ 
condition in a letter, dated January 21, 1965. After re-
viewing plaintiff's condition, Dr. Nusbaum concluued, 
"It is my opinion that this gentleman has an rcephalo 
pathy, diffuse and severe ,secondary to cerebral anoxi,1 
resulting from prolonged status epilepticus. He has :: 
seizure disorder which resulted in the status epileptic·.us, 
probably a focal cortical onset in the right hemisphen., 
secondary to a remote brain and head injury, but with th1· 
status epilepticus very likely precipitated by fatlg111 
and fluid loss, and electrnlyte imbalance associated wlt/1 
the performance of heavy labor in a confined spacl' 
(R. 17). 
Dr. Nusbaum testified at the hearing that it is not 
at all unusual for a seizure caused from electrolyte illl-
balance to occur within a period of 3 days aftPr t!t1· 
1 
seizure activity. During the hearing, Dr. Nm;baurn \ra~ 
question on why his conclusions differed from the medi<'al 
panel. Speaking of the panel's report, Dr. Nusbaum testi-
fied as follows (R. 192-193) : 
"Dr. Nusbaum - But the conclusion I think ' 
that they based their decision on, the findings that 
they based their decision on, was lack of evideneP 
of circumstances arising out of his confinement 
in this narrow space they mentioned as eontrihnt- . 
ing to his seizures. 'Vhere I disagree apparent!) 
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with the panel is that l - on an assumption that 
there was heavy perspiration associated by the 
patient, when I examined him - I concluded that 
his seizures had a relationship to this confined 
space and the high temperature. 
The Referee - Well, that is a good statement. 
or course, in the last analysis the Commission 
mnst make the finding and conclusion that he was 
n 1ally working in unusual temperature, and un-
usual exertion for him." 
Tl1e uwdical panel's first report made findings that 
on tlw way to the hospital plaintiff's seizure activity 
Isd('d "for a minute or two." The panel concluded that 
in spitP of the findings and conclusions of plaintiff's own 
doctor, KPnneth J. Nielson, and the consulting neurolo-
~i,t. Dr. Daniel Nusbaum, that there was "no good evi-
CTeD('P that the alleged injury on or about July 17, 1964, 
had any direct relationship to producing the cerebral 
o:tatns notPd or that the alleged injury aggravated a pre-
Pxisting condition resulting in the present cerebral sta-
tu~." It is important to note, however, the panel recog-
uized that "further evidence in the case which might bear 
significantl)T on the determination of disability arising 
from the alleged injury might bear consideration in the 
future.'' (R. 147-148). The last sentence was stricken 
from the report by the Commission on the grounds the 
pal!e] exceeded its authority. 
Following the hearing on the medical evidence, the 
ras\\ 1vas ag·ain referred to the panel. The medical panel's 
0P"onri r0port simply reaffirmed their first report in 
~pitr of the fact that they now recognized that the dura-
tion of tlw sPiznre activity lasted not a few minutes but 
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for over a period of 24 hours after the patient wa~ w: 
mitted to the hospital (R. 202-203). 
Based upon the second medical report, the Coit1 
mission found that there was "no evidence that the SPizurr· 
activity was directly related to the circumstances sur. 
rounding the applicant's employment prior to th<' onsl•nt 
of his recurrent focal and generalized convulsive al'tii 
ity following admission to the hospital.'' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE SEIZURE ACTIV-
ITY WAS RELATED TO THE EMPLOYMENT 
Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Annotated, 195::l, JJro 
vides, inter alia, that the Utah Supreme Court may affim1 
or set aside an award of the Industrial Commission npon , 
the following grounds : 
1. That the Commission acted without or in exc·1·:;:; 
of its powers; 
2. That the findings of fact do not support t/J1 
award. 
The issue in this case is whether the Commission 
acted unreasonably in concluding that the seizure activity 
rendering plaintiff totally and permanently disabled \\'H> 
not related to the employment. 
Cases of this type have been decided many time:'l Ji: 
the Utah Supreme Court. In Jones v. California Packiug 
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L,;;JJ 1:21 Utah GU, 2.J--1 P.2d 6-10 (1951), Jones was a 
forcinan of the California Packing Company at Hooper, 
L'[al1. As foreman, Jones was required to get a certain 
"]!Pit viner' · going and keep it in operation over a brief 
period of time known as a "campaign" which involved 
lnng working hours during the short harvesting season. 
Tiouhle oceurred in a booster motor and Jones was re-
riui!'Pd to work with it constantly. During the three days 
ptior to the accident, Jones was required to work 11-¥2, 
rH~ and J 5-% hours each day. On the day of the injury, 
.Jorws started working at 2 :00 o'clock in the morning. He 
11·as apparently alright at 6 :30 o'clock in the morning. He 
for hrf'akfast and returnd at 7 :00 o'clock. He continued 
10 1york with the balky engine, squatting over it to adjust 
1hr carburetor or trying to crank it until 8 :30 or 9 :00 
o'eloek in the morning when he became ill and complained 
ol' stornach distress, a violent headache and pain in his 
l'lwst; his eolor was bad and he appeared clammy ac-
c·ording to several witnesses. Shortly after 9 :00 a.m. he 
1rPnt home. He continued to have pains in his chest and 
liaek an<l \\·as sweating profusely. He lay down on the bed 
and within a few minutes he was dead. 
Both sides agreed that he died of a coronary occlu-
,;ion, hut disagreed upon the question of whether the 
occlusion was caused by his work. The Utah Supreme 
l'rrnrt ht>ld that the decedent's death, caused by a coron-
::1·y (H'elusion suffered by decedent following a three day 
i"~riod of hard physical labor with little rest, was an 
H<'eidPnt arising out of and in the course of decedent's 
Plllployment. r:rhe court set aside the Commission's order 
;1nrl 1·ernanded for further proceedings holding that the 
10 
Commission actPd unreasonably and arbitrarily in 
1
, 
fusing to believe competent evidence. 
The court set out some "cardinal principle8 " goy_ 
erning cases of this type at 121 Utah 615: 
"This court has repeatedly held that tlH· 
Workmen's Compensation Act should be 1iberaJJ 1 
construed to effectuate its purposes, and wht>1.',. 
there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor ol 
coverage of the employee. See M. & K. CoqJ. v. 
Industrial Comm., 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132. 
It is settled beyond question that a pre-exist-
ing disease or other disturbed condition or defect 
of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by an 
industrial accident is compensable under the act, 
Graybar Electric ·Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 
73 Utah 568, 276 P. 161; Thomas D. Dee Memorial 
Hospital Ass 'n v. Industrial iComm., 104 Ftah til, 
138 P.2d 233. And also that an internal failure 
brought about by exertion in the course of employ. 
ment may be an accident within the meaning of 
Sec. 42-1-43, U.<C.A. 1943, without the requirement 
that the injury result from some incidl-'nt whith 
happened suddenly and is identifiable at a definifr 
time and place. Robertson v. Industrial Comm .. 
109 Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Mern- i 
orial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Comm., supra: 
Hammond v. Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 67, 3-1 
P.2d 687; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961, 966. In the latter case, 
Mr. Justice Wade stated: 
' ... this court is definitely committed to thr 
proposition that where an employee suffers an 
internal failure or breakdown which results from 
overexertion in the course of his employment 
that such is a compensable accidental injury . · ·' 
Citing cases." 
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'l'Jwre 1s no dispute in the instant case that plaintiff 
liaJ a head injury about 25 years previous when he was 
:hro\rn from a horse. Sudsequent study revealed a sub-
ilnnil }Jp1110toma and surgery was performed to remove 
tlw blood dot. There was no history that plaintiff had 
1,,.l'l. hacl any kind of seizure activity (R. 146). The seiz-
lll'P oecuned some 55 hours following the heavy labor in 
,1 i'Oul'ined space accompanied by a great deal of fatigue, 
1 wr~piration and some shortness of breath. During this 
:,~ Jwm period, plaintiff engaged in no strenuous or un-
11,ual physieal activity. In fact, he was so fatigued from 
tlw 1n-·ek's work that he spent the large part of Satur-
rla>· resting. Dr. "Nusbaum testified that under these 
l'1mditions th<> seizure activity was associated with the 
pn•-t•xisting brain injury and was "very likely precipi-
t8tt'd by fatigue and fluid loss, and electrolyte imbalance 
~1ssociated with the performance of heavy labor in a 
ionfirn•cl spacP." (R. 195. 196). 
Fnder these circumstances it is clear that the inter-
nal failnrt> was brought about by exertion in the course 
11f e111ployment and is compensable under the act. 
In the .Tones case, supra, the court found that the 
portion of the medical evidence which concluded the 
~trenuous work did not cause the internal failure, was 
not sufficient c->vidence of substance that the evidence of 
1hr other doctors which had every appearance of trust-
11·orthiness c·ould be rejected. 
8irnilarly in the instant case, the medical panel 
t'Xamined plaintiff for only an hour and a half (R. 162). 
~lorp i1nportantly, there is no indication in eithPr of their 
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reports or in their testimony to the Cornmi~sion, that tl:i 
evidence adduced during the hearing of February s, 1~ 111 , 1 
when plaintiff and his co-workers wen• t-xamine<l mii; 
cross-examined , was even considered by or availahlP tii 
the panel. ·without a full appreciation of plaintiff's work. 
ing conditions prior to the seizure tlH• panel rrport~ (·an 
he given little weight. 
Even though the Commission itself stated that tii1,i 
would eventually have to rule on plaintiff's working ('or: 
ditions (R. 192), they failed to independently make that 
determination and instead merely adopted thP medical 
panel's report who based their conclusions, at best, on R 
meager knowledge of plaintiff's working conditions niJ. 
tained during a short interview. 
In Standa1rd Coal i:. Industrial Commission, W rtal1 
83, 252 P. 292 (·1926), the court stated at 69 Utah 9J: 
"It is no defense to a claim for compensation that 
1 
the injury lighted up, reopen0d or revived an e~ 
isting infirmity of the injured employPe. Surh i' 
the holding of this court in the cases cited abon 
The principle or rule of law there announced i~ 
supported by the great weight of authority, if nor 
by the unanimous opinions of this comi. Our stat 
utes prescribe no standards of health or of phY~· 
ical conditions to entitle one to thc> benefits o1 
the Compensation act." 
It has often been held that if an erroneous statemPnl ' 
in the Commission's order is so mistaken in fact or in la11 
that in its absence there would be a reasonable likeli· 
hood of a different result, a reversal is justified. Carling . 
1'. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2<l 260, 2G3, 399 P.~d 1 
13 
( 1%5); Walker v. Peters.on, ::.i Utah 2d 54, 278P.2d 
~:Jl ( 1 !JS+). 
In the <'ase at bar the Commission found there was 
"no evidence the seizure activity was directly related to 
IJw eircmustarn_.es surrounding applicant's employment." 
i.H. 210). This finding is clearly erroneous and com-
111,·t(·ly disn~gards the testimony of plaintiff's doctor and 
tlie comrnlting neurologist, Drs. Nielson and Nusbaum. 
In tlw absPnct) of the Commission's erroneous finding, a 
rlin'1·n•nt r<'sult would certainly obtain and a reversal is 
1•ll'tHly j us ti fied. 
In 'J'lwmas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. In-
J111/rial Connn., 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233 (1943), the 
(·ourt eonsidered the question of whether or not extra 
1rnrk or ovm·exertion constitute an "accident" in the 
'tatnt('. Applicant was suffering from a heart disease 
p1·io1 to thP night the "accident" occurred. On that night 
hP \ms rNtuired to do heavy lifting greatly in excess of 
his normal duties. After his shift ended at 8 :00 a.m., he 
11Pnt l10nw and rested until afternoon. He then went to 
cee l11s dodor who diagnosed his condition as a coronary 
neelusion resulting in his total disability. The court speak-
ing through Justice Wolfe affirmed the Commission's 
ordPr awarding compensation for the pre-existing heart 
nilmont aggravated by overexertion, relying upon Harm-
11101/d r. Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). 
AftPr eiting the facts of the Hammond case, supra, the 
1·11nrt stated at 104 Utah 67: 
.. rrhe opinion was thus based on the series of 'ef-
forts' and 'exertions.' The only distinguished fea-
14 
ture between the facts of that case [ Hauu1101 ii 
and this_ [Dee Memorial] might be in the deg:·~, 1: 
of exe~1ons. In both cases the injured emplovt~e 
was domg work of the same type usually done. bl' 
hime but the work was heavier than usual. Bot! 
had continuous overexertions. Both suffered ~ 
heart attack. Experts in both cases testified that 
the overexertion contributed to the disability 01. 
death. Both had pre-existing heart ailments which 
were aggravated by_ the ov~rexertio~. _'rhere a]l-
pears to be no loglCal basis for d1stmguishin" 
these cases." - ~ 
It is submitted there is no logical basis for distin-
guishing the Dee Memorial and Hammond cases, supra, 
from the case at bar. In the instant case competent me<l-
ical witnesses testified that the seizures were caused by 
overexertion. The testimony that overexertion was pn-
sent was uncontradicted; the only disputable item 11a~ 
the degree of overexertion. The Commission aded arbi-
trarily and unreasonably in failing to recognize the hold-
ings of these cases that such overexertion constitutes an 
accident within the meaning of Sec. 42-1-43, U.C.A. 19~~. 
In Robertson v. Industrial Comm., 109 Utah 25, 163 
P.2d 331 (1945), the court was presented with a similar 
problem. The medical experts were of the opinion tha! 
the deceased workman suffered an acute heart affliction 
shortly before his death. The question was whether tlw 
heart affliction resulted from pulling on the leg of a i 
dead horse during the course of his employment. One 
of the doctors expressed the opinion that the cause of 
death was brought on by the overexertion. The court 
stated at 109 Utah 28: 
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'·Our first task is to determine whether the evi-
dence shows just ordinary exertion, and whether 
the testimony of witnesses is properly reflected 
in the decision. As to the medical testimony, it 
::;e1'lIIS clear to us that the Commission miscon-
et-ived the import therof." 
Tl1e court held that the factual premise of the Com-
1111,~ion -- ordinary exertion - was not supported by the 
1,.(·ord. Ba8ed upon the Hammond and Dee .Memorial 
1" 1;,es, supra, the court vacated the Commission's order. 
lt is 1:mbmitted that the Commission in the instant 
1·ase failed to make the determination of whether or not 
plaintiff was working in unusual temperature and un-
nsual exertion for him. The panel report failed to take 
into aecount the full extent of plaintiff's activities and 
ii ~t>erns clear the Commission misconceived the import 
tlwreof in adopting the medical panel's conclusion. The 
1
rand made no finding or reference to plaintiff's unusual 
~1rPating, salt loss nad electrolyte imbalance. They offer 
1w explanation of what triggered the seizure after admit-
trng plaintiff had been seizure free for 25 years. In this 
l'('gard it is important to note that the medical panel's 
fin;t report concluded that future evidence in the case 
might bear significantly on the determination of dis-
ability arising from the alleged injury. The medical panel 
n·rognizt>d a deficiency in the facts available to them. 
l'nder such circumstances it is submitted the Corn-
111i~sio11 actPd unreasonably in failing to make a deter-
111ination, obvious from uncontroverted facts, that plain-
tiff's ovprexertion in the course of employment was an 
iwi·idrnt within the meaning of Sec. 42-1--13, P.C.A. 19-1-3, 
16 
and is compensable under thP act, and that ~ueh a('(·iJ1•111 
triggered the seizure activity resulting in plaintiff\ di, 
ability. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the order of th~ 
Industrial Commission is contrary to law and that th" 
same should be reversed with instructions to award 1·o1r1-
pensation in accordance with the Industrial Act, or in the 
alternative, that the matter should be remanded for fur-
ther hearing. 
Respectfully submitted,, 
GARY L. THEURER 
4'.Z8 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah -
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